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Elias: Elias: In Search of a Broader Stream of Commerce Theory:

In Search of a Broader
Stream of Commerce Theory:
The Eighth Circuit Streams Past
Inconsistencies in Favor of Equitable Results
Clune v. Alimak AB
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, "the stream of commerce" theory of personal
jurisdiction has created confusion and conflict among courts as to the number
and type of contacts a nonresident manufacturer must have with a forum state
before that manufacturer can be subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum.
The point of contention among the federal courts has been on the issue whether
a manufacturer can be amenable to suit in a state, absent a direct marketing
presence, by the mere fact that it places its product into the stream of commerce.
Indeed the Supreme Court has offered little in the way of guidance on the issue,
producing only a plurality opinion on the very question in the case of Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.2
In the wake of Asahi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has waivered on the issue In its earlier opinions, the court adopted
Justice O'Connor's approach to the stream of commerce theory, holding that the
act of inserting a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is an
insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.4 The court, however, continually has
moved away from the stance it took in those earlier opinions toward the broader
stream of commerce theory that Justice Brennan advocated.' Following its most
recent opinion on the issue, Clune v. Alimak.AB,6 the court has all but rejected
its earlier stance, producing inconsistent, albeit equitable, results.
This Note discusses the evolution of th stream of commerce theory. First,
it discusses the origin of the theory and the early split amongst state courts.
Next, it discusses the modem Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue,
including the plurality decision in Asahi. Finally, this Note discusses the
evolution of the theory in the Eighth Circuit and argues that, while the case law
is inconsistent, the results are equitable.

1. 233 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2551 (2001).
2. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
3. See infra notes 108-53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 127-53 and accompanying text.
6. 233 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2551 (2001).
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
This action arose after Joseph Clune fell to his death from an unenclosed
area on top of a construction hoist while working at a construction site in Kansas
City, Missouri. 7 Clune's wife and children subsequently filed a wrongful death
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri'
against the manufacturer of the construction hoist, Linden-Alimak AB/Alimak
AB' ("Alimak AB"). The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.'"
Alimak AB was a Swedish corporation that designed and manufactured
construction hoists exclusively for the United States market." In 1972, Alimak
AB sold the hoist in question F.O.B.' 2 Swedish port to Alimak, Inc.' 3 Alimak,
Inc., was Alimak AB's exclusive distributor in the United States, maintaining an
office in Oregon.' 4 The distributor imported the hoist via Seattle, Washington,
and the hoist subsequently ended up in the possession of J.E. Dunn, Clune's
Missouri employer.S

7. See id. at 540. A construction hoist is a temporary elevator-like structure used
by workers during the construction of buildings. Id. at 540 n. 1.
8. See id. at 538, 540.
9. Linden-Alimak AB/Alimak AB was the name of the corporation as it existed in
1972, the time relevant to this lawsuit. Id. at 540. Since the initiation of the suit, the
corporation has undergone several name and identity changes. See id. at 540 n.3. For
the sake of clarity, this Note, like the court, will refer to the corporation as it existed in
1972.
10. See id. at 540.
11. See id. at 540, 543.
12. The term F.O.B. stands for "free on board," a "mercantile term denoting the
seller is responsible for delivering goods on board a ship or other conveyance for carriage
to the consignee at a specified location." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (7th ed. 1999).
In the instant case, Alimak AB had "the risk of loss" only until it delivered the product
to the Swedish port, whereby all risk shifted to the buyer, Alimak, Inc. See Clune, 233
F.3d at 541.
13. Id. at 540. Alimak, Inc., also has undergone many identity and name changes.
Id. at 540-41. For the sake of clarity, this Note will refer to the distributor as Alimak,
Inc.

14. See id. at 540, 541. Even though Alimak, Inc., was the exclusive distributor
of Alimak AB and had a similar name, the court noted that the two companies were
"distinct." Id. at 541 n.4. Alimak, Inc., "paid employees through its own payroll,
provided its own policies, rules and regulations, and paid for its Swedish parent's
products when it purchased F.O.B. Swedish port." Id. Therefore, for the purposes of the

court's jurisdictional analysis, it treated the two companies as separate entities. See
generally id. at 540-46.
15. See id. at 538, 541. No admissible evidence was present in the record as to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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Aside from selling its products to a United States distributor, Alimak AB
had a few other contacts with the United States. The Swedish company provided
sales brochures and instruction manuals to Alimak, Inc., for use in promoting
and servicing its products. 6 Alimak AB also conducted training seminars in the
United States for technicians employed by its distributor. 7 Additionally, Alimak
AB's logo appeared on its product, and some of its members served as directors
18
of Alimak, Inc.
Alimak AB had a limited connection with Missouri. The company's
strongest connection with the forum was the fact that twenty to forty of the seven
hundred hoists that the company sold in the United States ended up in
Missouri. 9 Aside from this connection, however, nothing in the record indicated
that Alimak AB maintained an office, agent, employee, property, or conducted
any advertising or solicitation in Missouri.2"
On the issue of personal jurisdiction, the Clunes argued before the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri that, by designing its
product for the United States market, Alimak AB intended to benefit from every
state where its distributor marketed.2' Therefore, the Clunes argued, the
company had established sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to maintain
an action in the state.2 Alimak AB, on the other hand, argued that designing a
product for the generalUnited States market, without more, was not enough to
establish sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to allow for jurisdiction in
the state.Y
The district court agreed with Alimak AB. It held that the company could
not be subject to personal jurisdiction because it "did not send its product 'into
a regionaldistributor with the expectation that the distributor [would] penetrate
a discrete, multi-State trade area.""'2 Accordingly, the district court dismissed
the case.2

who or what entities owned and operated the hoist between Alimak, Inc.'s importation
of the product and the time of Clune's accident. See Appellant's Brief at 3, Clune (No.
00-1009).
16. See Clune, 233 F.3d. at 544.
17. See id. at 543.
18. See id. at 543, 544.
19. Seeid. at 543-44.
20. See generally id. at 543-44.
21. See Appellant's Brief at 28-32, Clune (No. 00-1009).
22. Id.
23. See Appellee's Brief at 48-51, Clune (No. 00-1009).
24. Clune, 233 F.3d at 544 (emphasis added) (quoting Vandelune v. 4B Elevator
Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Synatel
Instrumentation Ltd. v. Vandelune, 525 U.S. 1018 (1998)).
25. Id. at 540.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed.26 The court rejected the district
court's distinction between those foreign manufacturers that sell to distributors
that market regionally and those that sell to distributors that market nationally. 27
The court stated that "[t]he difference is one of form, not function, and the
practical effect is the same."2 It held that "a foreign manufacturer that
successfully employs one or two distributors to cover the United States intends
to reap the benefit of sales in every state where those distributors market."29
Therefore, the court held that Alimak AB "purposefully directed its products to
the United States through the distribution system it set up in this country," and,
thus, had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to suit in the
30
forum.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bright disagreed with the majority's holding,
stating that it was overly broad.3' He stated that the majority's "application of
the stream of commerce theory would subject a foreign entity to suit in any state
of the Union where the product ended up, regardless of the original destination
for the article or how the particular product happened to be in a particular place
in any state."32 Not wishing to adopt such a broad stream of commerce theory,
he rejected the majority's conclusion.33

26. See id.
27. See id. at 544.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 544-45. Having established the minimum contacts, the Eighth Circuit
went on to the second part of the jurisdictional analysis, the fairness analysis. The court
weighed Alimak AB's contacts with the state against:
the burden on [Alimak AB] of defending itself in Missouri, the interest of
Missouri in adjudicating the dispute, the Clune's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of [the] matter, the judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of [the] matter, and the shared interest
of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. at 545. The details of the court's holding on this issue are not central to this Note.
It is sufficient to say that the court found personal jurisdiction in Missouri proper under
these circumstances. See generally id. at 545-46.
31. See id. at 546 (Bright, J., concurring). Judge Bright, however, did find personal
jurisdiction proper in this case. He based this conclusion not on the majority's stream
of commerce theory but on a line of cases holding that parent corporations exercising
enough control over their subsidiaries are not separate entities from those subsidiaries for
purposes of personal jurisdiction. See id. (Bright, J., concurring). The majority rejected
this conclusion, holding that Alimak AB and Alimak, Inc., were "distinct" companies.
See supranote 14.
32. Clune, 233 F.3d at 546 (Bright, J., concurring).
33. See id. (Bright, J., concurring).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. PersonalJurisdictionand Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 "limits the power
of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant. 3' 5 It requires that, absent consent or presence in the forum, a
nonresident defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' 36 This test forjurisdictional contacts is not"mechanical
or quantitative," but, rather, depends "upon the quality and nature of [a
defendant's] activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."37
When analyzing the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court and the lower courts follow a two-step process, whereby they examine:
(1) the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the state; and (2) the
reasonableness and fairness of subjecting the defendant to personal jurisdiction
under the circumstances.38 A court first must determine if a defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy due process.39 To
establish such contacts, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws."4 While the contacts must be such that a defendant reasonably should
anticipate that his or her acts would have consequences in the state,
foreseeability alone is not a"sufficient benchmark forpersonal jurisdiction under

34. The Fourteenth Amendment, in pertinent part, states that no "State [shall]

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
35. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
36. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
37. Id. at 319.
38. See Clune, 233 F.3d at 545 (holding that "[w]ith minimum contacts satisfied,
we must next balance those contacts" against factors offairness andreasonableness); see

also Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that "in addition to determining whether a defendant has purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum state, courts must also examine" factors
of fairness and reasonableness). See generallyAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of
Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
39. See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
40. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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the Due Process Clause."'" Furthermore, the contacts must be those of the
defendant, and the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. 42
Once a court finds that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts, the
court next determines whether it would be fair and reasonable under the
43
circumstances to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum.
The Supreme Court has held that courts must determine such fairness and
reasonableness by evaluating five factors." These factors are: (1) the burden on
the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interests of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.45 If, after weighing
these factors, a court determines that jurisdiction is fair and reasonable, the court
constitutionally may subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum.'
B. Stream of Commerce Theory: Its Origin and Early Developments
Courts created the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction to
address difficult cases where products or services of an out-of-state enterprise
cause injury in the forum state.47 Yet, since its inception, the theory has
produced conflicting opinions among courts." The point of contention has been
whether the mere fact that a nonresident corporation's product reaches a forum
through the chain ofdistribution is a contact sufficient to subject that corporation
to personal jurisdiction in the forum.
Among the pioneers in answering this question was the Illinois Supreme
Court in Gray v. American Radiator& StandardSanitaryCorp.49 The plaintiff
in that case sued an Ohio component parts manufacturer for producing a
defective safety valve that caused a water heater to explode and injure the

41. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). For
a more detailed treatment of the foreseeability element ofpersonal jurisdiction, see infra
notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
42. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.

43.
44.
45.
46.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co.v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
See id.
See id.

47. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 36(g), at 104 (2d ed. 1993).

48. See infranotes 49-60 and accompanying text.
49. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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plaintiff.5" The defendant's only contact with Illinois stemmed from a safety
valve it sold to a Pennsylvania manufacturer, which then incorporated the valve
into one of its water heaters, "which in the course of commerce was sold to an
Illinois consumer."' The court found this limited contact was sufficient to
subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Illinois.52 It held that the fact that a
manufacturer only indirectly benefits from a forum's laws:
does not make [the forum] any less essential to the conduct of his
business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises
from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of such products
in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State
to justify a requirement that he defend here. 3
Not all states adopted this liberal approach to the stream of commerce
theory of personal jurisdiction. In Hodge v. Sands ManufacturingCo.,' the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that foreign corporations did
not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement by the mere fact that theirproducts
were sold in the forum.55 The case involved facts almost identical to those in
Gray, where the plaintiff sued an out-of-state water heater manufacturer and an
out-of-state component parts manufacturer for a product defect.56 As in Gray,
none of the defendants in Hodgesold their products directly to the plaintiff, and
the only contact the defendants had with the forum was that their products ended
up in the plaintiff's possession through the course of commerce.57 In recognizing
the similarities between this case and Gray, the court held that "though this
Court has given due consideration to [the Gray] decision[], it is not disposed to
accord [it] convincing force or effect in its decision of the case at bar.""8
Accordingly, the court did not subject either defendant to personal jurisdiction 9

50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 762.
Id. at 764.
See id. at 766.
Id. For early cases that held similarly to Gray on nearly identical facts, see
generally Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963);
Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960).
54. 150 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1966).
55. See id. at 802.
56. See id.
57. See id. The manufacturer ofthe water heater sold the heater to an "independent
dealer" in West Virginia, who subsequently sold the product to the plaintiff. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.; see also Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D.
I11. 1965) (holding that the mere fact that a product ends up in a state through the stream
of commerce does not establish the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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From its inception, the stream of commerce theory has produced conflicting
results as to the number and type of contacts a foreign corporation must have
with a forum state before it can be constitutionally amenable to suit in the forum.
As the above cases indicate, whether a foreign manufacturer could be subject to
personal jurisdiction in a forum depended largely on where the fortuitous event
of injury occurred.' During this early period, the states had little Supreme Court
guidance on the issue, and it would not be until twenty years after the Gray
decision that the Court would address the stream of commerce theory squarely
and attempt to define its parameters.
C. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson:
Mere Foreseeabilityis Not Enough
The Supreme Court first considered the stream of commerce theory of
personal jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.6' In WorldWide Volkswagen, the plaintiff sued, among other defendants, an automobile
distributor and retailer in an Oklahoma court for defective design.62 The plaintiff
bought a car in New York, and, while passing through Oklahoma, suffered
severe injuries in a fire resulting from a rear-end collision.63
Both the distributor and the retailer were New York corporations with their
principle places of business in New York." The corporations did not conduct
business in Oklahoma, had no agent in the state, and did not advertise in or
solicit business from the state.6" Furthermore, no evidence existed that either
defendant ever had sold a car that entered Oklahoma prior to selling the
automobile to the plaintiffs."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper. 67 The
court held that an automobile is "by its very design and purpose so mobile that
petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma."68 The court further held
that "under the facts we believe it reasonable to infer, given the retail value of
the automobile, that the petitioners derive substantial income from automobiles

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supranotes 47-59 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
See id. at 288.
See id.
See id at 288-89.
See id. at 289.
See id.
See id. at 289-91.
Id. at 290.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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' For these reasons,
which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma."69
the court allowed jurisdiction in the forum.7"
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 71 While the Court
acknowledged that, because of modem conveniences, limits on personal
jurisdiction "have been substantially relaxed over the years,"'72 the Court held
that, "[n]evertheless, we have never [held] ... that state lines are irrelevant for
' The Court
jurisdictional purposes."73
further held that the defendants had not
purposefully availed themselves of the Oklahoma forum, stating:

[W]e find... a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are
a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close
no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none
of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no
business there either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor [do] ... they indirectly,

through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short,
respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and
whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous
circumstance that a single.., automobile, sold in New York to New
York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through
Oklahoma.74
In reversing the state court decision, the Court refuted the idea that
jurisdiction was proper because it was foreseeable that the car could cause injury
in Oklahoma. The Court held that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause."75
To hold otherwise, the Court continued, in effect, would make a chattel its

69. Id.

70. See id. at 289-91.
71. See id. at 291,299 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 317
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 292.
73. Id. at 293.
74. Id. at 295. The Court did acknowledge that the defendants may not have
obtained any revenue for the automobile but for the fact that it was capable of use in
distant states like Oklahoma. See id. at 298. The Court, however, held that "whatever
marginal revenues petitioners may receive by virtue of the fact that their products are
capable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to justify that State's exercise
of in personamjurisdiction over them." Id. at 299.
75. Id. at 295.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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seller's agent for service of process, causing the seller's "amenability to suit [to]
travel with the chattel."76
The Court, however, held that "foreseeability is not wholly irrelevant.""
Notwithstanding:
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.7"

The Court reasoned that requiring more of a connection "gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit."7' 9

While the Court did not provide specific examples, it did give some
indication as to what amount of contact with a state sufficiently would ensure the
degree of predictability needed to subject a defendant to suit in the forum under
the stream of commerce theory. In dicta, the Court stated that if the sale of a
product "is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its
products in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States."8 The Court further stated that "the forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."'"
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court, thus, established a limit on in
personam jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory-that the mere
awareness that a product could end up in a state by the unilateral activity of a
consumer is not, in and of itself, sufficient to supportjurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the Court did not issue any clear rules on the number of affiliating contacts
necessary to subject a nonresident manufacturer to personal jurisdiction. Seven
years later, however, a sharply divided Court would attempt to define these
parameters more clearly.

76. Id. at 296.
77. Id. at 297.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 297-98.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11

10

2002]

Elias: Elias: In Search of a Broader Stream of Commerce Theory:
STREAM OF COMMERCE

D. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California:
The Court Splits Along a FamiliarLine
In Asahi,82 the Court finally addressed an issue that had divided lower
courts for more than twenty years: whether the mere awareness by a
manufacturer that its products indirectly will reach a forum state through the
chain of distribution is a sufficient contact with the forum to subject that
manufacturer to personal jurisdiction.83 The plaintiff, a Japanese tire
manufacturer, brought an indemnity action in a California court against Asahi,
another Japanese manufacturer, for selling defective tire valve assemblies." The
plaintiff had incorporated the valve assemblies into its tires, and one of those
tires subsequently became the subject of a California products liability suit.8"
The plaintiff sought indemnification from Asahi after it had settled the products
6
liability suit out of court.1
Asahi had limited contacts with California. While Asahi's products did
reach California through the chain of distribution, the defendant derived only
around one percent of its income from the plaintiff tire manufacturer." Asahi
had "no offices, property, or agents in California." 8 "Nor did the defendant
solicit any business or make any direct sales in California. Moreover, Asahi did
not design or control the system of distribution that carried its valve assemblies
into California." 9
All Justices, with the exception of Justice Scalia, held in this case that
personal jurisdiction was unconstitutional." The majority held that, under the
circumstances, it was not fair or reasonable to hail the foreign manufacturer into
a California court."' Although the Court agreed almost unanimously that

82. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

83. See id. at 105.
84. See id. at 106.
85. See id. The tire manufacturer had sold the tire to a motorcycle manufacturer
that subsequently incorporated the tire into one of its motorcycles that it sold in
California. Id. The Californian who purchased the motorcycle suffered serious injuries
after the tire in question blew out. Id.
86. See id.
87. See id. The plaintiff, in turn, made about twenty percent of its sales in the
United States to the State of California. See id.
88. See id. at 108.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 116-22.
91. See id. Applying the fairness and reasonable test, the Court found: (1) the

burden on the defendant was severe because the defendant was from a foreign country;
(2) the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining efficient relief was slight because the plaintiff
was also from a foreign country; (3) California's interest in hearing the dispute was
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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personal jurisdiction was not fair under the circumstances, the Court split sharply
on the issue whether Asahi had established sufficient minimum contacts with
California.92
Four Justices, led by Justice O'Connor, held that Asahi did not have
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to establish personal jurisdiction.93
O'Connor first reiterated the dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen that the "forum
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum State."94 O'Connor, however, held that "[t]he placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State."95 O'Connor further held that
there must be some "additional conduct" by a defendant, such as: "designing the
product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as
the sales agent in the forum State."96 But "a defendant's awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State." 97
A four-Justice concurrence, led by Justice Brennan, disagreed with
O'Connor, holding that a manufacturer that places its product in the stream of
commerce has sufficient minimum contacts with all states in the chain of
distribution.98 Refuting O'Connor's contention that there must be some
"additional conduct," Brennan held that "[t]he stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."9 9 As long "as a
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the

slight, as this was an indemnity action between two foreign corporations; and (4) neither
the interstate judicial system nor the states had a significant interest in considering the
procedural and substantive policies of foreign nations. See id. at 114-15.
92. See id. at 116, 121.
93. See id. at 108-13. Joining Justice O'Connor were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Powell and Scalia. See id. at 105.
94. Id. at 109.
95. Id. at 112.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id.at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Joining Justice Brennan were Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise."'' 0
Brennan concluded that defendants who derive an economic benefit from the
forum indirectly benefit from the state's laws, regardless of whether there is
additional conduct directed toward the state.'
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the test that O'Connor articulated. 11 He
criticized O'Connor's conclusion that a distinct line exists between "mere
awareness" and "purposeful availment. '1 3 Stevens, however, did not adopt
Brennan's conclusion that the mere placement of a product within the stream of
commerce is enough of a contact to support jurisdiction in a foram."' Instead,
Stevens argued that the minimum contacts test "requires a constitutional
determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous
character of the components."'0 5
InAsahi, the Court failed to provide a majority opinion as far as a clear test
as to what constitutes sufficient minimum contacts for the stream of commerce
theory. Given the traditional split among the lower courts on the issue, it is not
surprising that the Court could not reach an agreement. 0 6 However, as a
practical matter, Asahi did anything but resolve the issue, and subsequent
decisions in the lower courts have continued to split.0 7

100. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's concurrence was
joined by Justices White and Blackmun. One may guess how the two joining Justices
can at once accept and reject Justice Brennan's approach.
103. See id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens did not determine whether
Asahi had sufficient contacts with California, as he argued that the Court's unanimous
determination that personal jurisdiction was unfair under the circumstances-rendering
the minimum contacts analysis unnecessary. See id.at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Stevens, however, did opine that "[i]n most circumstances I would be inclined to
conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units
annually over a period of several years would constitute 'purposeful availment."' Id. at
122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. For a comparison of the conflicting state approaches to the stream of
commerce theory adopted early on by the lower courts, see supra notes 47-60 and
accompanying text.
107. Subsequent cases have categorized the law in one ofthree ways. Some have
adopted Justice O'Connor's approach in the Asahi decision. See Terracom v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that O'Connor's approach in
Asahi is the current law); Bond v. Octagon Process, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 710, 713 (M.D.
Ga. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232 (1991). Others have adopted Justice
Brennan's approach. See Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 280-82 (3d Cir.
1994) (discussing prior decisions with rationales substantially similar to Justice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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E. Stream of Commerce in the Eighth CircuitAfter Asahi
Since Asahi, the stream of commerce theory in the Eighth Circuit has
traveled an inconsistent but seemingly deliberate path. Initially embracing
O'Connor's "additional conduct" approach, the circuit continually has backed
away from its original position and has moved toward Brennan's broader
interpretation of the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction.
Roughly one year after Asahi, the Eighth Circuit rendered its first
interpretation of the decision in FalkirkMiningCo. v. JapanSteel Works, Ltd.' 8
The plaintiffmining company sued a Japanese manufacturer inNorth Dakota for
producing a defective part in a walking dragline crane0 9 purchased by the
plaintiff."' The defendant had sold the component part, F.O.B. Japanese port,"'
to a dragline manufacturer in Ohio.' 1 2 The manufacturer subsequently
incorporated the part into one of its own draglines and sold it to the plaintiff in
North Dakota."'3 While the defendant and the Ohio manufacturer had several
contacts with each other," 4 the defendant had no related contacts with the forum
other than the fact that its product ended up in the state through the chain of
distribution."'

Brennan's approach); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415,420 (5th
Cir. 1993). Still, other courts have ignored the Asahi decision and still look to WorldWide Volkswagen for guidance. See Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d

383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Because the Court's splintered view of minimum contacts in
Asahi provides no clear guidance on this issue, we continue to gauge.., contacts ... by
the stream of commerce standard as described in World-Wide Volkswagen ....
"), cert.

deniedsub nom. Jugometal Enter. For Imp. & Exp. of Ores & Metals v. Irving, 493 U.S.
823 (1989).

108. 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
109. A walking dragline crane is an "enormous piece of machinery" used in mining
operations, weighing about "13.5 million pounds and stand[ing more than] 17 stories
high." Id. at 371 n.1.
110. See id. at 371-72. The defendant's component part had cracked, causing
approximately five-hundred-thousand dollars in damage to the plaintiff. Id. at 372.
111. For the definition of F.O.B., see supra note 12.
112. Falkirk, 906 F.2d at 372.
113. Id. at 371-72.
114. At the Ohio manufacturer's request, the defendant designed its component
parts specifically for the dragline purchased by the plaintiff. See id. at 371. Additionally,
the Ohio manufacturer provided the design for the part, and it sent officials to Japan to

monitor the defendant's construction of the part. See id.
115. See id. at 375. The defendant had no office, agents, employees, or property
in North Dakota. See id. Furthermore, the company did not advertise or otherwise solicit
business in the state. See id. The defendant neither had a contractual relationship with
the forum company, nor did the company create, control, or employ the distribution
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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The Eighth Circuit held that subjecting the defendant inFalkirktopersonal
jurisdiction was unconstitutional because the defendant lacked sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum." 6 Inreaching this conclusion, the court noted
the similarity between the facts of Falkirk and those in Asahi, and adopted
O'Connor's "additional conduct" test to resolve the issue." 7 The court
concluded that, "[1]ike the nonresident defendant in Asahi, [the defendant's]
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more does not
constitute an act of the defendant purposefully directed towards the forum
State." 8
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its Falkirk "additional conduct" test two
years later in Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel."9 The defendant in Gould was an

Indonesian steel manufacturer that advertised in a worldwide publication.' The
defendant had contracted to sell fourteen-thousand metric tons of its products to
a nationwide distributor located in New York and had sent its agents to the
United States to meet with representatives from the New York distributor during
negotiations for this contract.' The defendant delivered the products F.O.B.
Indonesia."' The distributor subsequently sold some of the products to an
Arkansas company, and one of that company's employees suffered permanent
injury while unpacking these products." The employee then brought a products
liability action in Arkansas against the defendant. 4
On the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff argued that because the
defendant advertised in a worldwide publication, sent agents to the United
States, and continually sold products to the United States, personal jurisdiction
was proper vis-i-vis the defendant."z The Eighth Circuit disagreed. While the
court recognized that "Arkansas has an [sic] strong interest in providing a forum
for an injured resident," the court held that, because the defendant was not
licensed to do business in the state, had no direct marketing presence there, and
did not specifically design its products for Arkansas, there were insufficient
contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. 6 The court further held that the
defendant's placement of its products into the stream of commerce was "not an
system that brought its product to North Dakota. See id.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
Seeid.
Id. at 376.
957 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992).
See id. at 574.
See id. at 574-75.

122. See id. at 575. For an explanation of the term F.O.B., see supra note 12.
123. See Gould,957 F.2d at 575.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 576.

126. Id.
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act 'purposefully directed' toward the state" and that "the fact that the
[defendant] could foresee that its product might find its way to Arkansas [was]
too attenuated to constitute purposeful availment of Arkansas' laws and
protections."' 27
Two years after Gould,however, the Eighth Circuit had an apparent change
of heart regarding its stream of commerce theory in Barone v. Rich Bros.
InterstateDisplayFireworksCo. 128 The plaintiff sued the defendant, a Japanese

fireworks manufacturer, in Nebraska after a fireworks display that he was
working on went awry. 129 The Japanese defendant sold the fireworks to one of
its nine distributors in South Dakota, which, in turn, sold them in Nebraska. 3
The defendant's nine distributors purchased, on average, $640,000 worth of
fireworks annually, which constituted, on average, slightly more than seventy
percent of the defendant's business.' 31 Sixteen percent of these purchases were
32
eventually resold in Nebraska.

The defendant, however, had no direct contacts with Nebraska. It had "no
office in Nebraska, no agent for service of process, [and] no distributor."' 13 3 In
addition, the defendant did not advertise in the state or send any of its products
into Nebraska. 34
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state to allow for personaljurisdiction. 35 The
court noted that the defendant strategically had selected its distributors "in an
effort to reach much of the country through a limited number of regional
distributors."' 136 The court, thus, concluded that, when a foreign manufacturer
"pour[s] its products" into a regional distributor with the expectation that the
distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-state trade area, the manufacturer has
"purposefully reaped the benefits" of the laws of each state in that trade area for
due process purposes."'

127. Id.
128. 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hosoya Fireworks Co. v.

Barone, 513 U.S. 948 (1994).
129. See id. at 610-11.

130. Id. The defendant's other distributors were located in California, Indiana,
Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 611.
131. Id. The defendant's South Dakota distributor purchased, on average, slightly
more than $100,000 worth of fireworks annually. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 615.

136. See id. at 613.
137. See id. at 615.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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In reaching this conclusion, the court attempted to reconcile this result with
Asahi and the court's prior decision in Falkirk. Taking a different view than it
did in Falkirk,the court held that O'Connor's opinion in Asahi did not govern
the minimum contacts test in the Eighth Circuit.'38 The court instead held that
Asahi failed to set new precedent because it lacked a majority opinion as to the
minimum contacts test for the stream of commerce theory. 13 9 Ultimately, the
court held that the pre-Asahilanguage of World-Wide Volkswagen controlled the
issue "that[,] when a manufacturer or distributor attempts to serve a market
'directly or indirectly. . ., it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in [that
market] if its allegedly defective merchandise has been the source of injury to its
owner or to others.""'
The court next attempted to reconcile its holding with its prior decision in
Falkirk."' The court distinguished Falkirk,holding that:
[in Falkirk,] a single component part manufactured by the defendant
was incorporated by a third party into a piece of equipment sold to the
plaintiff in the forum state. No evidence was presented indicating that
the defendant either knew or should have known its component part
would end up in the forum state, nor was there evidence that the
defendant had availed itself in any way of the benefits of the laws of
the forum state' 42
As a result, the court concluded that, unlike in the present case, the contacts in
Falkirk were "attenuated, random, [and] fortuitous" and, therefore,
distinguishable from the court's present holding. 43
138. See id.at 614. The court said, "[i]n short,Asahi stands for no more than that
it is unreasonable to adjudicate third-party litigation between two foreign companies in
this country absent consent by the nonresident defendant." Id.;see alsoVandelune v. 4B
Elevator Components, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir.) (holding that the minimum contacts
debate in Asahi "remains an open question"), cert. denied sub nom. Synatel
Instrumentation Ltd. v. Vandelune, 525 U.S. 1018 (1998).
139. See Barone,25 F.3d at 614. The court did note, however, that:
[s]hould one engage in vote counting, which we are loath to do, it appears that
five justices agreed that continuous placement of a significant number of
products into the stream of commerce with knowledge that the product would
be distributed into the forum state represents sufficient minimum contacts to
satisfy due process.
Id.
140. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297
(1980)).
141. See id. at 615.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Reaffirming its holding in Barone, the Eighth Circuit again held the
exercise of jurisdiction proper over a foreign manufacturer in Vandelune v. 4B
ElevatorComponents.'" The defendant in the case was an English manufacturer
that had sold a grain elevator safety switch to an English distributor. 4 The
English distributor subsequently sold the product to an Illinois distributor.'" The
Illinois distributor then sold the product to an Iowa business, which ultimately
installed the safety switch into the plaintiff's grain elevator. 47 The plaintiff sued
the defendant in an Iowa court for products liability after his grain elevator
a
exploded, causing him severe injuries.'4
Like the defendants in Barone, Falkirk, Gould, and Asahi, the defendant
had no direct marketing presence in the forum state. 49 But the court noted that:
(1) the defendant, while it had not sold directly to the Illinois distributor, had
agreed to distribute the product through the Illinois company; (2) the defendant
put its logo on its product; (3) the defendant shipped its product directly to the
Illinois distributor, which was about eighty miles from the Iowa border; (4) the
defendant's employees attended technical support meetings at the Iowa
distributor's facility; (5) the defendant designed its product for the United States
market; and (6) eighty-one of the 619 safety switches that the defendant sold in
the United States were resold in Iowa 5 0 On these facts, the court held that the
defendant had "'pour[ed] its products' into a regional distributor with the
expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade
area."''M The court, therefore, concluded that the defendant had "'purposefully
reaped the benefits' of the laws of each State in that trade area for due process
5 2
purposes."'
After Vandelune and Barone,the court clearly had established, contrary to
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi and contrary to its own decision in Falkirk,that a
foreign manufacturer may besubject to personal jurisdiction in a state without
a direct marketing presence in that forum. 3 According to the court, however,
Falkirkwasstill good law, thereby precluding the court from adopting Brennan's
interpretation that a defendant's mere awareness that a product may reach the
forum state through the chain of distribution is a sufficient contact to establish

144. 148 F.3d 943 (8th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Synatel Instrumentation Ltd.
v. Vandelune, 525 U.S. 1018 (1998).
145. Id. at 945.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 948.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/11
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jurisdiction. Vandelune and Barone apparently attempted to achieve a middle
ground between O'Connor and Brennan, holding a nonresident manufacturer
with no direct marketing presence in the forum amenable to suit in that forum
only if that manufacturer attempted to penetrate a discrete multi-state area
through regional distributors. Nevertheless, in its next decision on the issue in
Clune,the Eighth Circuit broadened its interpretation ofthe stream of commerce
theory even further and all but embraced Brennan's stream of commerce theory.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Clune, the Eighth Circuit found that a foreign manufacturer with no
marketing presence in the forum state purposefully avails itself of the forum's
laws when it sells its product to a distributor that has sales territories throughout
54
the United States.
In reaching this conclusion, the court applied its holdings in Barone and
Vandelune, and found that Alimak AB had significant contacts with Missouri for
the following reasons: (1) Alimak AB designed its construction hoists for
United States markets where it had exclusive agreements with United States
distributors; (2) its logo appeared on its products; (3) Alimak AB conducted
training seminars in the United States for technicians employed by its United
States distributor; (4) the company provided sales brochures and instruction
manuals to its distributors for use in promoting its products; and (5) of the seven
hundred construction hoists that Alimak AB sold in the United States, twenty to
forty of them ended up in Missouri. 155 The court held that while "[a]ny of these
facts, taken alone, might fall short of purposeful availment,

. . .

when taken

together they show that [Alimak AB] engaged in a series of activities that were
designed to generate profits to the [company] from.., sales across the United
56
States."
The court next addressed the district court's ruling that Alimak AB should
not be subject to jurisdiction in Missouri because it sent its product to a national
distributor, rather than to "a regional distributor with the expectation that the
distributor [would] penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area."'" The court
quickly dismissed this distinction, holding that "[a multi-state] foreign
manufacturer that successfully employs a number of regional distributors to

154. Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.

Ct. 2551 (2001).
155. See id. at 543.
156. Id. at 544.
157. Id.
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cover the United States intends to reap the benefits of sales in every state where
the distributors market."' 8 The court concluded that the "difference is one of
form, not function, and the practical effect is the same."' 59
Finally, the court addressed its earlier decisions in Falkirk and Gould,
holding that the cases were distinguishable from its present holding.' The court
held that the present case was distinguishable because there was evidence of
continuous transactions between Alimak AB and its United States distributors. 6'
The court also noted that, unlike the defendant in Clune, the defendant in Falkirk
never visited the United States nor was there any evidence that the defendant
knew or should have known that its product would end up in the forum State. 62
The court finally noted that the litigation in its earlier decisions involved
commercial disputes, "which [are] distinct from the Clune's personal injury
claim against [Alimak AB]."' 63 The court, therefore, held that the granting of
jurisdiction in this case would not be inconsistent with its earlier decisions."
Based on these reasons, the court held that Alimak AB "purposefully
directed its products to the United States through the distribution system it set up
in this country."' 6 The court thus held that the "company knew that[,] by virtue
of this system, its construction hoists entered the Missouri and other Midwest
markets."' 66 Therefore, the court concluded that Alimak AB's "creation of the
system that brought hoists to Missouri established sufficient minimum contacts
with that forum to satisfy the due process standards set by the Supreme Court
and followed by this circuit." 67
B. The Concurrence
Judge Bright concurred in the result only, holding, "I do not agree with the
stream of commerce theory of the majority."' 68 He made note ofthe fact that the
Swedish company shipped the construction hoist F.O.B. Swedish port to a
distributor located in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. 69 Judge Bright

158. Id.
159. Id.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 545 n.9.
Id.
Id.
Id.

164. See id.

165. Id. at 544.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 546 (Bright, J., concurring). For a discussion on Judge Bright's
rationale for extending personal jurisdiction, see supra note 31.
169. Clune, 233 F.3d at 546 (Bright, J., concurring).
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concluded that the majority's "application of the stream of commerce theory
would subject a foreign entity to suit in any state of the Union where the product
ended up, regardless of the original destination for the article or170how the
particular product happened to be in a particular place in any state."'
V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit significantly departed from its Falkirk and Gould
decisions regarding the stream of commerce theory, and its Clune decision, in
effect, has limited those decisions to their specific facts. The problem with the
opinion, however, stems not from the court's change of heart but from the
court's logic in its attempt to distinguish the cases. As a consequence, the court
has achieved a proper result through inconsistent reasoning.

A. The InconsistentReasoning
The court in Clune, by holding that a foreign manufacturer with no direct
marketing presence in the forum state is subject to personal jurisdiction when its
products end up in that state through a national distributor, in effect, has
overruled its prior holdings in Falkirk and Gould. In reaching this holding,
however, the court inadequately distinguished the case from its prior holdings.
The similarities among Clune, Falkirk, and Gould are striking. All three
cases involved foreign manufacturers whose products ended up in the forum
state through a nationwide distributor. '' None of the defendants in the cases had
72
offices, agents, property, bank accounts, or operations inthe forum states. The
173
states.
the
from
directly
manufacturers did not advertise or solicit business
Furthermore, none of the manufacturers were licensed to do business in the
forums. 74 Finally, all of the manufacturers shipped their products F.O.B. from
their respective countries.'
The court, however, made several distinctions among the cases. First, the
court made note of the fact that, in the present case, the manufacturer had an
ongoing relationship with its distributor, while the other cases involved limited
transactions. 76 However, in light of the Falkirk case, this reasoning is

170. 1d. (Bright, J., concurring).
171. See supra notes 107-53 and accompanying
172. See supranotes 107-53 and accompanying
173. See supranotes 107-53 and accompanying
174. See supranotes 107-53 and accompanying
175. See supranotes 107-53 and accompanying
176. See Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538,545
121 S. Ct. 2551 (2001).

text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
n.9 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
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unpersuasive. Falkirk involved a major project for a 13.5-million ton piece of
machinery. 77 In fact, the Ohio distributors visited Japan on three separate
occasions to monitor the manufacture of the parts.178 Because of the significant
interaction between the manufacturer and the distributor, the court incorrectly
classified this transaction as limited.
The court also attempted to distinguish Clune from Falkirk and Gould by
the fact that the latter cases "involved a commercial dispute between merchants,
which is distinct from Clune's personal injury claim against" Alimak AB."'9
This distinction, however, also lacks merit as the court misstated the facts.
Gould was a products liability action for a personal injury that an Arkansas
employee sustained while unloading the defendant's products.' It hardly can
be said to involve merely a commercial dispute. Therefore, the court's
distinction fails here, as well.
Finally, the court attempted to distinguish Clune by the fact that, unlike the
defendant in Falkirk,the defendant in Clune, "at a minimum, had constructive
knowledge that its construction hoists would end up in Missouri.""1 ' However,
in its prior cases, the court held that the mere awareness that a product would end
up in a forum was not a dispositive factor in extending personal jurisdiction.'8 2
In Gould,the court held that, "[s]tanding alone, the fact that [a defendant] could
foresee that its product might find its way to [a state] is too attenuated to
constitute purposeful availment of [that state's] laws and protections."' 3
Therefore, the court's attempt to distinguish the cases on Alimak AB's
constructive knowledge that its products would end up in Missouri is
unpersuasive.
In sum, the Eighth Circuit has not distinguished its holding in Clune from
its earlier decisions in Falkirk and Gould satisfactorily. Thus, the court
effectively has overruled its prior decisions and fully embraced Brennan's liberal
stream of commerce theory. But, even though the court used some inconsistent
logic and fact application to get there, it has switched to the better view.

177. See generally Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369
(8th Cir. 1990).
178. See id. at 375.
179. Clune, 233 F.3d at 538.

180. See Gould v. P.T. Krakatau Steel, 957 F.2d 573, 575 (8th Cir. 1992).
181. See Clune, 233 F.3d at 545 n.9.
182. See Gould, 957 F.2d at 576.
183. Id.
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B. The Right Result
In determining which stream ofcommerce theory is preferable (O'Connor's
view or Brennan's view), it is important to understand the competing policy
concerns. On the one hand, there is the concern of promoting predictability in
the legal system. As Justice White stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, requiring
a more direct connection between a defendant and a forum state "gives a degree
ofpredictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit."'' He admonished that making
foreseeability the criterion for minimum contacts, in effect, turns a seller's
chattels into roving agents for service ofprocess, subjecting a seller to suit in all
fifty states.'
Against this interest, however, the strong interests of the forum state and
resident plaintiff must be weighed. The state has "a strong interest in providing
an effective means of redress for its injured resident who would find it
impractical to sue in the defendant's jurisdiction."' 86 The resident plaintiff also
has a "strong interest in avoiding the expense, inconvenience, and potential bias
of the foreign defendant's jurisdiction," which "generally offer plaintiffs fewer
87
chances of recovery."
Afterbalancing the interests, itis preferable to pick the policies favoring the
forum state and plaintiff.' After all, it is the manufacturer that voluntary places
its product into the stream of commerce, while it is the plaintiff who involuntary
suffers injury. Furthermore, by prohibiting indirect contacts as a sufficient basis
for extending personal jurisdiction, a manufacturer could insulate itself from
lawsuits "by selling its products F.O.B. at a single location, by using a single
'independent' distributor to distribute its products nationwide, or by using

184. World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
185. See id. at 296; see also Clune, 233 F.3d at 546 (Bright, J., concurring).
186. Erik T. Moe, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of
Commerce Doctrine,BarelyAlive But Still Kicking, 76 GEo. L.J. 203, 220 (1987); see
also Gould,957 F.2d at 576 (recognizing that states have a "strong interest in providing
a forum for an injured resident to bring a products liability action against a nonresident
defendant").
187. See Moe, supranote 186, at 220-21.

188. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610,615 (8th Cir.)
(holding that "it is only reasonable for companies that allegedly distribute defective
products through... distributors in this country to anticipate being haled into courts by
plaintiffs in their home states"), cert. deniedsub nom. Hosoya Fireworks Co. v. Barone,
513 U.S. 948 (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 11
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 67

brokers who theoretically are 'responsible' for any direct contacts with a
particular forum."' 189
Applying the liberal stream of commerce theory in Clune, the Eighth
Circuit reached the right result. Twenty to forty of Alimak AB's hoists ended
up in Missouri; therefore, subjecting Alimak AB to suit in the forum was not an
unforeseeable consequence of its actions. 9 ' Furthermore, the liberal theory
helps ensure the widowed family of Mr. Clune will recover for its loss by saving
the family the expense and possible bias of bringing a suit in distant Oregon, or,
even worse, Sweden.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction
has created conflict among courts. The dividing line has been whether a foreign
manufacturer that merely places its product into the stream of commerce can be
amenable to suit in a forum state absent a direct marketing presence in the forum.
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance to the lower courts, as it was
unable to obtain a majority on the issue in the landmark case of Asahi. In the
wake of Asahi, the Eighth Circuit recently has taken an inconsistent path in
liberalizing its stream of commerce theory. However, though the path is
inconsistent, the result is equitable, and the Eighth Circuit has helped ensure that
Eighth Circuit plaintiffs will get their day in court.
RICHARD M. ELIAS
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LITIG. 239, 271 (1988). Note that, in Clune, the manufacturer did just this. It shipped
its product F.O.B. Swedish port to its sole distributor with which it had a very close
relationship (including a common name). See Clune, 233 F.3d at 540. One only can
wonder whether Alimak AB had such surreptitious motives in its actions.
190. See id. at 543-44.
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